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Abstract 
 
Conventional analyses claim that small states bandwagon with leading international powers. 
The dominant view is that small states’ vulnerabilities and limited power hinders their ability 
to pursue policy goals. This study critiques this position by investigating why and how Jordan 
continues to pursue a nuclear energy programme despite objections from the United States – 
its principle ally. By using theories of small states, this study analyses discursive practices in 
Jordanian policy-making. This approach is used to describe Jordan’s nuclear energy policy 
and posit a logic of the effects that energy insecurity has on the government’s perception of 
Jordan as a ‘small state’. I use this to create hypotheses concerning the conditions under 
which small states may not simply bandwagon with key international allies, but may have 
more freedom to pursue their goals than traditional analyses predict. Explanations that 
assume small states always have limited freedom to pursue policy goals without the backing 
of key allies are not supported by the evidence considered here. 
 
Keywords: small states, foreign policy, Jordan, nuclear energy, energy security2 
 
Introduction 
 
This study considers two questions pertaining to small states: first, what constitutes a small 
state? Second, do small states simply bandwagon and comply with their great power allies or 
can they independently pursue their own goals even given objections from great powers? A 
third question addressed is: to what extent is nuclear energy proliferation a viable policy for 
small states? By analysing Jordanian nuclear energy policy in the face of objections by the 
United States, this article analyses the impact of discursive securitisation and agency on small 
states’ behaviour. Like Smith and Lee (2010, 1095) this study sees ‘discourses as constitutive 
of material reality’. Specifically with regards to Jordan, this project seeks to understand the 
ways in which discursive elements impact the creation of self-perceptions of Jordan as a 
small state and how this in turn informs policy making with regards to energy security. The 
argument presented here is that small states in the contemporary Middle East are created by 
dominant discourses of smallness and that, as a result of the dynamic nature of this discourse, 
can pursue independent policies rather than simply bandwagon with great powers. 
Conclusions are drawn on the conditions in which small states may pursue a more 
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independent policy direction rather than simply bandwagon with great power allies3. It is 
important to note here that this article does not seek to assess whether small states always or 
never bandwagon with great powers; it simply investigates whether pursuing an independent, 
‘can do’ policy is possible in at least one issue area. Furthermore, the purpose of this study is 
to investigate the specific interests underpinning Jordanian policy with regards to nuclear 
energy by examining the government’s pursuit of nuclear energy. As such the following 
analysis does not seek to assess the impact of a policy outcome (i.e. post-implementation).4  
This study develops another avenue for research into small states and their domestic 
and foreign policies by bringing the Middle East into the debates (and the debates into 
research on the Middle East). During its formative years, IR as a discipline was focused on 
relations between great powers during the inter-World Wars period, and then superpowers 
during the Cold War era (Amstrup 1976, 163-164). The post-Cold War environment, 
however, encouraged interest in the foreign policies of small states and their roles in the 
emerging international system (Simpson 2006, 649; Hey 2003, 1-2). Paul Streeten (1993, 
197-202), Jeanne Hey (2003, 75-94), Baldur Thorhallson and Anders Wivel (2006, 651-668), 
and Christopher S. Browning (2006, 670-684) have been key in furthering this area of 
investigation. However, these and other scholars have focused on Western small states, often 
in the context of the European Union or other Western-dominated organisations. The risk 
here is for IR to have developed to the point where small states are seen as relevant and 
worthy of study, but only where they are either in the West, or are studied in relation to the 
interests of Western states. This study examines domestic and foreign policies pertaining to 
nuclear energy development in Jordan as a small state, and sees this as an area of 
investigation worthy of consideration both to further our understanding of Jordanian policy-
making, and also small states situated outside of Europe/the West. Here the work of Ian 
Taylor (2014, 187-201), Alan Chong (2014, 202-222) and Timothy Shaw (2014, 223-240) 
offer useful examples of research on non-European small states.  
Discussions of nuclear technology proliferation which often consider nuclear energy 
development within the context of nuclear weapons proliferation/non-proliferation (including: 
Sagan 1996; Fuhrmann 2009b; and Gartzke and Jo 2009), have largely been restricted to 
proliferation in great powers, middle powers, and regional powers. In the Middle East context 
this has included a body of research on nuclear programmes in Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and 
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study considers the importance of energy insecurity experienced by Jordan as reflected in 
Jordanian decision making and state discourse that has emerged out of the experience of 
relying on external sources for energy. In this way, examining policy as opposed to policy 
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provide us with conclusions about state behaviour – something that analysing policy 
outcomes often cannot adequately achieve (for example, even if a favourable change in 
Jordanian imports of energy were to arise this would not provide it with energy security nor 
would it reverse the government’s experiences of previous favourable cases (oil from Iraq 
and gas from Egypt as discussed below) that did not provide Jordan with energy security). 
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Egypt (see: Kamrava 2012). Current nuclear technology proliferation trends in the Middle 
East and elsewhere, however, are no longer limited to these categories of states. Jordan, 
Yemen and Oman among others, that have traditionally been understood as small states are 
now pursuing nuclear energy programmes (some with more vigour and success than others) 
which suggests a new area of consideration for understanding nuclear technology 
proliferation. It is now quite certain that the potential to develop nuclear capabilities (whether 
peaceful or otherwise) is no longer limited to ‘large states’ – of course in the case of small 
states the development of these capabilities will continue to rely on the ability of these actors 
to access the necessary knowledge, technologies, resources, training and finances from 
external actors. This study is part of a broader effort to understand the nature of small states’ 
nuclear technology proliferation (primarily in the form of nuclear energy but with some 
implications for the weaponisation of nuclear technologies, for example through the 
development of uranium enrichment capabilities and the production of heavy water – both of 
which are necessary for the production of nuclear fuels for use in energy production facilities, 
as well as nuclear weapons).    
This article is divided into three sections. The first section offers a review of relevant 
discussions on how small states can be defined and what is assumed about the impact of 
smallness on behaviour. Assertions that the definitional problem can be resolved by 
observing material realities are critiqued in favour of the discursive approach that sees 
smallness as a perceptual rather than material issue. The second section provides an overview 
of Jordanian nuclear energy policy by considering firstly, Jordan’s energy security and its 
internal and external roots, and its nuclear energy policy. The final substantive section in this 
article analyses the evidence provided in section two using the discursive approach to 
understanding small states set out in section one. Final conclusions are then drawn about 
what constitutes a small state in the Middle East, whether we can expect small states to 
simply bandwagon with great powers, and whether the proliferation of nuclear technology for 
energy production is a viable policy for small states.   
 
Defining smallness and explaining small states’ behaviour  
 
As discussed below, earlier literature on small states was concerned with the problem of 
defining smallness and therefore small states. More recent research, however, has discussed 
the methodological difficulties and intellectual limitations of defining the material constraints 
placed on small states by their inherent smallness. As Browning (2006, 670) notes identifying 
‘what counts as a ‘small state’ [is] notoriously difficult. Attempts to formulate ‘objective’ 
markers of smallness by referring to things like the absolute size of a country’s resources, 
whether in terms of territory, population, size of gross domestic product (GDP), military 
capacity, etc have been common […]’. Adopting this methodology encourages us to look at 
smallness as relative to power capabilities where the latter consists of materially measurable 
phenomena such as ‘numbers of guns, planes, soldiers or size of GDP’ (ibid). There are a 
number of problems with this approach, but of particular importance to this study is the view 
of power as relative to certain military factors and their economic/industrial foundations. 
Furthermore, as noted by Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel (2006, 652) there are 
substantial challenges in systematically theorising power, and ‘in attempting to systematise 
what we already know and to identify what we need to know’ about small states’ behaviour. 
A discussion of whether or not Jordan can be classified as a small state according to 
more traditional methodologies that focus on measurable, material realities is unnecessary 
and unhelpful here for two reasons. Firstly, previous studies such as Paul Streeten’s ‘The 
Special Problems of Small Countries’ (1993, 197-202) that rely on a rather arbitrary 
assessment of population size (with 10 million people being the cut-off level for small states), 
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or Tom Crowards’ (2002, 143-179) work on defining the small state category (which 
considers population size, land area and total income) have already concluded that Jordan is a 
small state (if we advocate these approaches). Secondly, this study is premised on the belief 
that the material-based methodologies are inherently flawed and ultimately do not help us to 
explain the behaviour of small states (using Steeten’s or Crowards’ approaches, for example, 
results in both Jordan and states like Israel with similar population sizes but wildly varying 
domestic and international capabilities, as being in the same category and therefore 
presumably expressive of the same patterns of behaviour).  
Niels Amstrup’s survey of research efforts (1976) offered a clear starting point for 
investigations in the late 1970s and early 1980s that sought to consider definitions of small 
states and the impact that smallness (as an independent variable) has on behaviour (as a 
dependent variable). A majority of research in this field since the late 1990s and early 2000s 
has moved beyond questions of definition and independent-dependent variable relations vis-
à-vis foreign policy, instead furthering the line of investigation originally developed by 
Robert L. Rothstein (1968) and Wilhelm Christmas-Moller (1970). This approach formed 
what Amstrup (1976, 166) summarised as a body of literature that ‘concentrates on size as a 
perceptual problem.’  
By the mid-2000s the literature had moved away from attempting to resolve the 
definitional debate and had also largely moved away from methodological approaches that 
focus on a set of measurable indicators. The small states research agenda is perhaps now 
dominated by considerations of broader questions relating to the discursive roots of smallness 
and the social constructs of what can and cannot be done in policy terms by small states. This 
constructivist approach has led Ole Wæver (2001, 20) to conclude that ‘[a]n analysis of 
domestic discourses on “we” concepts like nation, “people” and Europe can explain – and up 
to a point predict – foreign policies […]’ of small states. Lee and Smith (2010, 1091-1105) 
explore smallness as a result of discursive practices and conclude that the discourse 
surrounding small states constructs their reality as opposed to simply describing it. It is 
possible to test this conclusion to see if it applies to the case of Jordan’s nuclear energy 
policy and the government’s decision to pursue an independent policy that is driven by self-
interest (in particular, in this case, ensuring national energy security) as opposed to adopting a 
policy of ‘bandwagoning’ (see: Walt 1987, 29) with US policies. It is important to note that 
this study does not seek to offer a simple critique of realist notions of balance of power/threat. 
This work does acknowledge the assumption that states are expected to bandwagon if they do 
not have the capabilities to meet a security challenge on their own as viable and offers an 
analysis of the extent to which capabilities are determined by discursive practice and not just 
material factors. 
One limitation that has hindered research on small states can be found in one of the 
core assumptions generally accepted about what is seen as the un-changing relationship 
between small states and great powers. Here small states are seen as ‘power consumers’ 
while great powers are regarded as ‘power suppliers’, and bandwagoning/the cooperation of 
small states with great powers represents the former consuming common goods (including 
international and domestic stability and security) provided by the latter (Amstrup 1976, 170). 
This assumption dates back at least to George Liska’s International Equilibrium (1957), and 
can be found as a core principle of Steven L. Spiegel’s Dominance and Diversity (1972), and 
is a theme in Robert Keohane’s ‘Lilliputians’ Dilemmas’ (1969, 291-310).  
A problem with this assumption, however, is that it ignores the potential for states to 
perceive themselves as small (and therefore be small according to the theoretical assumptions 
made here) yet still possess the ability to transform their ability to ‘supply power’ for 
themselves. It is unhelpful to assume, first of all, that ‘power’ should be understood as 
constant/un-changing, applicable to varying contexts across space and time, and as having the 
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same impact on providing security/stability regardless of the specificities of even comparable 
actors. Secondly, change in perceptions, discourse, capabilities (be they economic, political, 
human/socio-cultural, security, or some combination thereof) and role/position in the 
international system are evident throughout history. IR scholarship has long accepted change 
as a feature of international relations (see, for example: Kennedy 1989).  
 A key policy response that small states can pursue in order to change their status as 
merely ‘power consumers’ is to utilise membership in international organisations and the 
increasingly globalised institutional frameworks that impact international relations such as 
the UN system and the World Trade Organisations and International Atomic Energy Agency 
regimes.  Building on earlier work by Annette Baker-Fox (1959), scholars including Neill 
Nugent (2006, 51-71), Lee and Smith (2008), and Amrita Narlikar (2006, 1005-1029) have 
studied small states’ membership in international organisations. Lee and Smith (2010, 1091-
1105) in particular highlight the importance of collective action in institutional settings to 
transform the discourse and practice of small states’ interests and capabilities (agency). 
Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006, 655) note that ‘[w]e could expect small states to favour 
institutionalisation of interstate relations in regional and world politics, because all members 
of international institutions are usually subject to the same rules and face the same sanctions 
if they break the rules.’  
Yet it is still important to consider the possibility that small states can act 
independently, albeit within a multilateral framework and with multiple stakeholders 
involved, to provide security for themselves without having to rely on the provision of power 
from one or more great power allies. Hans Mouritzen (1991; 1994) has argued that 
understanding small states’ foreign policies requires us to consider their position in the 
international system (the ‘constellation that the weak power belongs to, being understood as 
its basic set of relationships to the strong powers in its salient environment’ (Mouritzen cited 
in Browning 2006, 671)). Here small states can be classified as being aligned to one pole in a 
bipolar system, be a satellite of a great power, be symmetrically positioned between great 
powers, or be adaptive/flexible in its alliances (ibid). It is not entirely clear how applicable 
this method of analysis is in the contemporary international system when small states 
prioritise institutional engagement through embedded international organisations in a 
multipolar system (see Browning 2006, 672-673).  
 David Vital (1967), Rothstein (1968) and Keohane (1969) all claimed that perceptions 
of smallness are essential to the identity of and, therefore, the reality of small states – with 
perceptions of weakness, vulnerability and lack of power as the over-arching identifying 
factors. Keohane (1969, 296) claims that ‘a small power is a state whose leaders consider that 
it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system.’ 
However, this position reinforces the view that small states share a similar (perhaps even 
identical) ‘mentality and set of preferences’ (Browning 2006, 673) and it discounts the 
potential for small states to react and adapt to changing international conditions. Peter 
Katzenstein (1985) concludes that a key characteristic of small states is, in fact, their 
adaptability. In this study, this assumption is taken further to consider discursive adaptability 
in Jordanian decision-making. Furthermore, we need to consider the validity of analyses that 
place emphasis on realist notions of power and the provision of security. Olav Knudsen 
argues that there are: 
 
six key variables that are central to preserving the autonomy of smaller 
states: strategic significance of geographic location, degree of tension 
between leading powers, phase of power cycle for nearest great power, 
historical record of relations between small state and nearest great power, 
the policies of other great powers and the existence of multilateral 
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frameworks for security cooperation (Knudsen cited in Thorhallsson and 
Wivel 2006, 656). 
 
 However, this focus is called into question when considering the emphasis that the 
Jordanian government has placed on energy security which is not accounted for in realist 
discussions of small state behaviour – largely because it is seen as a domestic issue and 
secondary to considerations of national survival in the international system. This study 
adopts the widely acknowledged definition presented by David Deese (1979, 140) where  
energy security is “a condition in which a nation perceives a high probability that it will 
have adequate energy supplies at affordable prices” over the long-term. As discussed below 
Jordanian nuclear energy policy demonstrates these assumptions to be incorrect, even if 
survival and the capabilities to ensure security are primary policy concerns. This study then 
seeks to help us better understand how both material variables and discursive practices can 
have an impact on the behaviour of small states – in particular by examining the relationship 
between the two variables where perceptions of capabilities create  discursive realities in 
small states, even with regards to security issues (this position differs to that made by 
Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006, 657-658) who argue that the relevant variables affecting 
small states’ policy making will vary depending on ‘spatio-temporal context’). 
Contrary to neorealist assumptions, the distinction between the international and 
national levels of analysis are increasingly blurred and the relationship between processes 
traditionally seen as distinct to one or other level have intensified. There is now significant 
reason to view international relations/the international political economy as not entirely 
separate levels or spheres of activity, but as reinforcing and impacting on each other. As such, 
this study adopts the position taken by Miriam Elman (1995, 171-217) in her assessment of 
small states’ choices in periods of crisis. She ‘argue[s] that whether international or domestic 
factors matter more is an empirical question and should not be assumed a priori. In contests 
between levels of analysis, neither domestic nor international arguments automatically win’ 
(ibid, 175). Elman (ibid, 172) demonstrates the opportunity that analysing small states’ 
foreign policy behaviour can offer to scholars interested in domestic level processes, and 
notes that ‘[small] state foreign policy presents a crucial test for domestic level theory. It is 
precisely in such cases where the conventional wisdom suggests that international factors can 
adequately account for state policy.’  
This study considers foreign and domestic policy as closely connected and as 
reinforcing each other. In other words, Jordanian nuclear energy policy has foreign and 
domestic characteristics and exists as part of a broader policy construct where the traditional 
distinctions between foreign and domestic do not entirely apply. Here, the work of Gvalia et 
al. (2013) is built upon to consider the importance of domestic level factors, in particular elite 
perceptions of the state. The difference being, however, that while Gvalia et al. criticise that 
‘[w]hen researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and 
international factors’ (ibid, 98), this study combines both external and internal processes and 
sees them as reinforcing each other.  
 
Jordanian Nuclear Policy and Governmental Discourse 
  
This section considers the main components of Jordanian nuclear energy policy and then 
analyses the discursive practice of creating Jordan as a small state. This is done by analysing 
primary evidence from the following elite sources in Jordanian policy-making: King 
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Abdullah II (hereon referred to as King Abdullah),5 the Jordanian Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources,6 and the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission.7 This evidence is supported 
by a review of Jordanian and international media coverage of Jordan’s nuclear energy policy. 
Alan Henrikson (2008, 1-20) has studied Jordanian diplomacy and Jordan’s role in several 
international processes, including the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and international 
environmental management. Henrikson argues that ‘[t]he international significance of some 
small countries, including the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is much greater than their size 
might suggest (ibid, 1) and  that ‘[p]erhaps no other small country is more governed by the 
importance that other, stronger countries place upon it’ (ibid). The following analysis adopts 
this assumption and develops it to take account of both internal and external perceptions of 
Jordan’s roles and abilities. Likewise, this analysis expands on Curtis Ryan’s (2003, 135-155) 
assessment of Jordanian foreign policy which ‘examines the sources of Jordanian foreign 
policy in an effort to move beyond explanatory models that see Jordanian foreign policy as 
either a pawn of the great powers or simply the whim of a king’ (ibid, 135).  
Jordan’s Nuclear Policy: Jordan faces two key challenges with regards to energy 
security. First, due to a near total lack of hydrocarbon resources, Jordan imports between 95% 
and 97% of its energy at a total cost of approximately 20% of its GDP (WNA 2014a). Second, 
reliance on an undiversified energy importing regime has left the country subject to economic 
shocks and vulnerability caused by unreliable supplies of oil from Iraq (after 2003) and gas 
from Egypt (since 2011) (El-Anis 2012, 27-31) which have forced the Jordanian government 
to buy hydrocarbon fuels on the global market at a much higher cost, thus increasing the 
budget deficit and hindering development. As a result of the government’s views on the 
country’s energy situation King Abdullah implemented a new energy strategy in 2007. This 
strategy includes the overall diversification of energy supplies to include a range of external 
sources, but more importantly the development of domestic sources including renewable and 
nuclear energy (GoJ 2007a). Figure 1 below summarises the government’s plan for energy 
diversification.   
Jordan’s nuclear energy policy began in earnest on the 1 April 2007 when then-
Energy Minister Khaled Sharida announced that Jordan was going to tender bids to build one 
nuclear power plant to produce electricity by 2015 (subsequently changed to 2021) (Stern 
2007). The Jordanian government plans to build up to five nuclear reactors to produce 
electricity over the next twenty years in order to meet growing electricity demand that is 
expected to increase from just under 3000MWe to 8000 MWe by 2030 (JAEC 2011, 1). The 
government seeks to build its first nuclear reactor with a generation capacity of 1100MWe at 
a cost of $5 billion by 2021, ‘with the option to build two nuclear reactors […] at a price of 
$9.4 billion and a total generation capacity of 2200MWe’ (ibid). Jordan’s Committee for 
Nuclear Strategy (established in 2007) plans to provide 30% of its electricity from nuclear 
energy by 2030 (ibid).  
A number of international private sector actors have been involved in developing 
Jordan’s nuclear energy programme. In 2008 the JAEC signed an agreement with the French 
                                                          
5 Transcripts and videos of interviews conducted with Jordanian and international media; 
transcripts of the King’s Speeches given to the Jordanian Parliament; the King’s Letters of 
Designation to Prime Ministers and other Ministers; the King’s Op-Eds in international media; 
and press releases issued by the Hashemite Royal Court. All of this material has been 
accessed via the King’s personal website (http://www.kingabdullah.jo/). Personal 
correspondence with a representative of the Royal Hashemite Court is also used here. 
6 The Ministry’s Annual Reports and Master Strategy for the Energy Sector 2007-2020. 
7 Reports to the government and private sector actors, along with personal correspondence 
with the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) Chairman). 
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nuclear company Areva (WNN 2008a) to explore for uranium deposits in Jordan. This was 
followed in 2009 by an agreement with the Australian firm Rio Tinto for further uranium 
exploration (WNN 2009a); an agreement with the Belgian firm Tractebel to conduct a site 
study for the first nuclear reactor (WNN 2009b); a deal with Australian firm Worley Parsons 
for pre-construction consultancy (WNN 2009c); a second agreement with Areva in 2010 for 
rights to mine uranium discovered (WNN 2010); and finally a 2013 initial agreement with 
Russia’s AtomStroyExport8 to build Jordan’s first nuclear power plant (WNN 2013). The 
uranium exploration carried out by Areva and Rio Tinto yielded estimates of over 120,000 
tonnes of uranium deposits in Jordan which would provide it with a domestic source of fuel 
for its nuclear programme. This has further encouraged the Jordanian policy with the 
Chairman of the JAEC, Dr Khaled Touqan, stating that Jordan would only need up to 500 
tonnes of uranium ore to fuel its programme for 150 years, thus increasing energy security 
through self-reliance and providing an export commodity (Touqan 2012). Uranium mining is 
expected to begin in the coming years (Ghazal 2014). 
A key component of the Jordanian government’s nuclear policy is to secure 
international support in the form of technology, capital, and infrastructure from state and non-
state actors through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. To date 11 bilateral cooperation 
agreements have been signed between Jordan and the following: Argentina, Canada, China, 
France, Japan, Romania, Russia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey and the UK (see: El-Anis 2012, 
34). Jordan also joined the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) (a US-led initiative to 
increase cooperation in nuclear technology proliferation (ostensibly technologies related to 
energy production but which can also have further use in the development of nuclear 
weapons) and manage sensitive technologies such as enriching uranium) in 2007 and is a 
member of the IAEA and a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and also 
signed the Additional Protocol’s to the NPT in 1998. However, despite initial positive 
overtures made in 2007, the United States has not supported Jordan’s nuclear energy policy. 
Negotiations were ongoing from 2008-2011 for a bilateral ‘123’ 9  nuclear cooperation 
agreement but these were suspended in March 2011 over US objections to Jordanian plans to 
enrich uranium in Jordan. The Jordanian government insists that in order to increase its 
energy security it needs to rely on domestic energy sources more, and with 3% of the world’s 
uranium deposits, mining and enriching uranium in Jordan would vastly decrease its 
vulnerability to external disruptions. The United States on the other hand has a broader non-
proliferation policy that rests on managing sensitive technologies such as uranium enrichment 
to ensure weaponisation is limited – this entails current nuclear capable states enriching 
uranium ore and then selling it to Jordan (see: El-Anis 2014). It is puzzling how, given the 
dominant small states narratives that conclude small states should bandwagon with great 
                                                          
8  This agreement and the selection of AtomStroyExport demonstrates the multilateral 
approach adopted by the Jordanian government. US-based corporations were not included in 
the bidding process as the absence of a “123” agreement prohibits their involvement. Given 
the nature of the selection process (and that actors from Canada, France and Japan also 
submitted bids) the Jordanian selection of AtomStroyExport should not be seen as simply an 
attempt to balance against the United States but as an extension of the urgency placed by the 
Jordanian government on achieving energy security (in short, Jordanian multilateralism in the 
pursuit of nuclear energy technologies and capabilities is founded on the government’s belief 
that domestic energy production is needed as soon as possible and that concerns for costs and 
over-reliance on any one actor (state or non-state) are important). 
9 So named after Section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954 titled ‘Cooperation 
With Other Nations’ which establishes the conditions for any nuclear cooperation between the 
United States and other countries. 
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power allies, Jordan has chosen not to accept US policy prescriptions here. We now turn to an 
analysis of Jordanian discourse for an explanation.  
 King Abdullah’s Discourse: There is little doubt that ultimately Jordanian decision-
making begins and ends with the king (see: Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009; Robins 
2004; Alan 2005; Joffe 2001; and Salibi 1998). Jordan’s nuclear energy policy centres on 
King Abdullah’s directives and any change in this policy is either instigated by the king or 
has to be approved by him. It is possible to identify three key themes in King Abdullah’s 
policies. The first theme is that Jordan is a vulnerable developing state that faces serious 
economic, developmental and other security challenges, and it has limited ability to impact 
on external processes to address these. Therefore, domestic responses are to be focused on – 
for example, developing nuclear energy to supply domestically produced energy. It is worth 
quoting the king at length here: 
 
[…] the coup de grace was the energy crisis at a time of unprecedentedly 
increasing energy and food prices. Nothing could be worse for a country that 
imports 96% of its energy and 87% of its food. Then we lost our gas supply 
from Egypt - the gas pipeline in the Sinai was blown up over 14 times since 
February 2011 - and Egypt this year [2012] has been pumping only about 16% 
of contracted quantities, and only around 30% last year. This unforeseen 
development doubled our energy bill and made our budget deficit sky-rocket. 
I want to say this as plainly as possible, the number one reason for the 
unprecedented budget deficit and extraordinary increase in national debt was 
the continuous interruptions in the gas supply from Egypt, at a time of 
historic highs in energy and food prices globally. 
Energy has historically been a choke point for Jordan. We need to break 
free and increase our self-reliance. The only way out of our vulnerability is to 
diversify our energy sources. We are exploring for gas in the East. Jordan is 
also the perfect country for solar, and we started tapping into it; wind is 
another potential source. Another part of the solution will be our peaceful 
nuclear energy programme […] Jordan has 3% of the world’s uranium 
resources. So we have a natural resource that makes nuclear a viable option 
for us, and would grant us some degree of self-reliance. 
We have to also consider that Jordan is the world’s fourth water-scarcest 
country and desalination will very soon be a priority. Nuclear energy will be 
the cheapest reliable way to desalinate water. (HRH King Abdullah II 2012a) 
 
A second theme is that development and security (at the domestic and international 
levels) are intertwined. He views the government’s goal as being ‘to aggressively develop the 
competitiveness of our economy, to ensure more rapid growth and to decrease the economy's 
dependence on foreign grants, thus helping us to graduate from reliance on aid to trade-led 
growth’ (HRH King Abdullah 2007a).  
A third identifiable theme is that energy security is central to both Jordanian 
development and overall security. In three (2007, 2008 and 2013) out of 13 ‘Speeches from 
the Throne’ (the speeches given by the king to open parliamentary sessions) energy security 
and energy policies feature prominently. In 2007 King Abdullah highlighted that the 
government had ‘made a strategic choice to diversify our energy resources and rationalise 
consumption so that neither citizens nor the homeland will remain hostage to the fluctuation 
of oil prices on the international market’ (HRH King Abdullah II 2007b). This was reinforced 
in 2008 when the King highlighted that ‘[i]n the energy sector, successive rises and 
fluctuations in oil prices impose upon us the need to quickly identify renewable and 
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alternative energy sources and to expedite the implementation of the nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes project’ (HRH King Abdullah II 2008). In 2013 the king expressed his 
increased concern that ‘[t]he government should expedite efforts to diversify energy sources, 
relying on alternative and renewable sources, and accelerate the implementation of […] 
energy mega-projects to strengthen our national economic security’ (HRH King Abdullah II 
2013).  
Since coming to power in 1999 King Abdullah has focused on energy security in six 
Letters of Designation to Prime Ministers (in 1999, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013, and 
most recently a Letter to the Prime Minister in 2014 – this is not a letter of designation). 
Notable here is the lack of focus on energy security in the early 2000s when supplies of oil 
from Iraq and then the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were guaranteed at low prices. In his 
1999 Letter of Designation to Abdul Raouf Rawabdeh the king stated ‘[w]e must intensify 
our search for new sources of energy […]’ (HRH King Abdullah II 1999). In 2007 the King’s 
attention had returned to energy security and in his Letter of Designation to Nader Dahabi he 
wrote that ‘[t]he scarcity of natural resources, especially energy and water resources, is the 
major challenge to sustainable development. We deem it necessary to work on ensuring 
energy security by efficiently utilising energy resources, searching for new sources of 
renewable and alternative energy and supporting all efforts to accelerate the realisation of the 
atomic energy programme for peaceful purposes’ (HRH King Abdullah II 2007c). By 2012 
we can see evidence that King Abdullah was increasingly concerned with energy insecurity 
and the challenges it posed for other governmental policies. In his Letter of Designation to 
Abdullah Ensour the king wrote: 
 
[e]nergy is at the heart of the economy. We were amongst the first countries 
in the region to realise the importance of gradual diversification of energy 
sources to protect our country against fluctuations in international market 
prices, and thus entrench the sovereignty and stability of our economic and 
development-related decision-making. The seriousness of such challenge is 
apparent in the steady rise in the energy bill and related subsidies, which 
have been affected by rising international prices and disruptions in the 
Egyptian gas supply. Accordingly, it is imperative for your government to 
expedite the implementation of programmes and policies that ensure the 
diversification of energy sources […]. The government is expected to 
accelerate strategic energy projects, as responding to this challenge is a 
national responsibility […] (HRH King Abdullah II, 2012b) (emphasis 
added).   
 
 The fourth policy theme identified through this research is that the king sees Jordan as 
able to develop nuclear energy and is within its rights to do so as a transparent, cooperative 
and stabilising actor. King Abdullah has argued that Jordan is capable of affording the cost of 
developing nuclear energy in collaboration with international private sector actors. He has 
stated that nuclear energy ‘is one of the cheapest energy sources around. As for plant 
construction costs […] [t]he nuclear power plant that the government is looking at would cost 
about JD3.5 billion for a plant that would constitute one-third of the total power capacity 
generated in Jordan today. The attacks on the Egyptian gas pipeline over the past two years 
have cost us already JD2.8 billion. That could have paid for almost one reactor’ (HRH King 
Abdullah II 2012a). Furthermore, a recurring theme in several of his statements on nuclear 
energy is that Jordan is acting as a model of transparency for other states in the Middle East 
to emulate: ‘[…] Jordan is in favour of the peaceful use of nuclear power as manifested in the 
model of the nuclear programme we seek to build. Transparency when presenting the project 
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to the world and nuclear safety are key in the Jordanian nuclear model’ (HRH King Abdullah 
II 2012c). A number of the central initiatives developed by King Abdullah (as found on his 
official website) centre on energy security: ‘The target as stated by the King is to achieve 
security of energy supply, to relieve pressure on the Jordanian economy and the general 
budget [and] to raise dependence on local energy sources from 4 per cent as of 2007 to 25 per 
cent in 2015 and then to 39 per cent by 2020.’ (HRH King Abdullah II 2014). Furthermore, 
he ‘has confirmed that Jordan will be a model in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes and will pursue its nuclear choice in harmony with the international standards and 
criteria relevant to uses of nuclear energy’ (ibid).  
The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, and JAEC Discourse: By 
analysing documentation published by the Ministry of Energy and the JAEC it is possible to 
identify three themes that overlap with King Abdullah’s visions. The first theme is that 
Jordan is a vulnerable developing country that faces significant developmental, economic and 
other security challenges due to its smallness and lack of resources. The JAEC notes that: 
 
Jordan is one of the ten most water-deprived countries in the world. 
Individual water consumption stands at ~160 cubic metres annually, 
compared to a global average of 7000 cubic metres. Reliable sources of clean 
water are necessary to support economic growth. As existing sources are 
depleted, large-scale water desalination capability is likely to be needed to 
increase the water supply. Because desalination is very energy-intensive, this 
will only further increase demand for energy. The supply gap is quite severe 
even today. The Ministry of Water and Irrigation is working intensively to 
develop new sources of water, including deep aquifers, but it is likely that 
desalination will need to be a part of the future water supply mix […] (JAEC 
2011, 2).  
 
In the 2007 ‘Master Strategy of [the] Energy Sector in Jordan for the Period 2007-
2020’ the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources identified a series of challenges to 
energy security for Jordan. A total of six pages out of the 26 page document are dedicated to 
these challenges, notable amongst which are the heavy reliance on energy imports, the limited 
number of external sources that are relied upon, and the underdeveloped nature of domestic 
energy production (MEMR 2007, 2-7).  
The second theme evident in JAEC discourse is that energy security is a pressing 
challenge for Jordan and it undermines broader developmental goals. A key benefit of nuclear 
energy highlighted by the JAEC is that it would ‘constitute a certain and reliable generation 
source of electricity for Jordan decreasing the dependence of the country on fossil fuel and 
natural gas, strengthening Jordan’s balance of payments, stimulating its economic growth and 
expanding employment opportunities’ (ibid, 1). The Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources states that the government’s plan is to reduce the ‘contribution of foreign sources 
in the primary energy mix [from] 96% in 2007 to 75% and 61% in the years 2015 and 2020 
respectively’ (MEMR 2007, 14). According to Khaled Touqan, the JAEC sees developing a 
domestic supply of fuel for its planned nuclear power stations is essential to reducing 
Jordanian vulnerability and energy insecurity – which he sees as amongst the most important 
‘security concerns facing Jordan’ (Touqan 2012). 
A third theme is that Jordan’s nuclear energy programme is, and will continue to be 
entirely transparent and based on an international multi-stakeholder approach. The JAEC 
argues that the Jordanian government ‘has fully recognized the prime importance of safety 
and security […] and works in very close cooperation with the IAEA and considers the 
IAEA’s active participation as assurance that all international IAEA safety and security 
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standards will be [met]’ (MEMR 2007, 5). The nuclear project has been presented to multi-
national corporations and foreign governments as being based on a build operate own (BOO) 
basis with potential ownership of 26-51% for the Jordanian government and 49-74% owned 
by strategic partner (ibid, 7). The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources’ recent annual 
reports include nuclear energy as a key component of Jordan’s future energy sources, 
reinforcing the view that Jordan’s pursuit of nuclear energy is certain to continue (see figure 
2 below). Furthermore, Khaled Touqan (2012) has claimed that developing domestic energy 
sources, including nuclear energy, is essential for Jordanian security and development in the 
short-, medium- and long-term and this is clear for all external actors to observe due to 
Jordan’s transparency on this issue.  
 
Redefining smallness and small state behaviour: Jordanian nuclear policy as ‘can do’ 
behaviour  
 
Observers would not be criticised for assuming that Jordan should, according to traditional 
accounts of smallness, bandwagon with the dominant US policies towards non-proliferation 
(of sensitive technologies that can be used for both energy production and weaponisation) 
which in this case study could mean abandoning nuclear energy altogether. Yet this has not 
happened, raising an interesting set of questions about why this policy direction has been 
chosen and how it is being implemented. Perhaps the answer lies in the ‘relationship between 
political discourses and small states’ identities based around specific practices of “smallness”’ 
(Smith et al 2005, ii). 
The constructive role of self-perceptions in the discursive process in Jordanian 
decision-making bodies reinforces the awareness of material vulnerabilities faced by Jordan 
in terms of energy security. But it also informs the reality of Jordanian smallness by framing 
the self-interested pursuit of energy security within a regional system in which the Jordanian 
government lacks the relative and/or structural power to impact the stability of energy supply 
from neighbouring states. In other words, narratives within Jordanian decision-making bodies 
end with Jordan being incapable due to material (military, political and economic) constraints 
to promote security and stability in Iraq and Egypt (Jordan’s principle energy suppliers since 
the early 1990s). Furthermore, Jordan is unable to secure favourable terms (such as heavily 
discounted prices) for hydrocarbon trade with suppliers in the GCC as a result of the 
government’s inability to promote narratives both within Jordan and in GCC states that it 
would be in the interest of the latter.  
Through reviewing Jordanian policy, governmental statements relating to nuclear 
energy and other policies, and the elite interviews conducted with decision makers in Amman, 
a discursive picture emerges. The Jordanian discourse is dominated by the following 
perceptions of Jordan as: 1) politically stable, but subject to increasing domestic pressures to 
provide public goods from an increasingly disquieted public; 2) a developing state (that is 
pursuing: industrialisation, increased overall economic productivity, the maintenance and 
enhancement of a business-friendly and open economy, regional and international economic 
integration, improved per capita income and living standards, improved education and 
training for its population, and the creation of jobs); 3) hindered in its pursuit of economic 
development by a lack of natural resources (in particular fossil fuels, freshwater and arable 
land); 4) economically vulnerable to external market processes (including disruption to 
capital flows, fluctuations in hydrocarbon markets, and increasing global competition for 
existing Jordanian export markets); 5) militarily capable of indefinitely defending Jordanian 
sovereignty against non-state actors but not against concerted efforts by one or more 
neighbouring states; 6) a stabilising force in regional politics (especially with regards to 
Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli relations); 7) a close regional ally of the United States and 
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the West in general; 8) a transparent and law-abiding member of the international community; 
9) a sovereign state with equal rights within embedded global institutional frameworks (such 
as the NPT). 
This discourse helps to maintain smallness as perhaps the most important 
characteristic of Jordanian reality. But rather than encouraging Jordan to bandwagon and 
adhere to the US view of nuclear energy proliferation, the construction of Jordan as a small 
state has encouraged the Jordanian government to prioritise energy security over 
bandwagoning with the United States. Here, perceiving and reinforcing the reality of Jordan 
as a small state encourages policy independence when a vital national interest is perceived as 
being better served by not deferring to the policy goals of the small state’s principle 
international backer. As Lee and Smith (2010, 1097) highlight there is an emerging logic that 
concludes that ‘for small states to succeed, they must take responsibility for their own fates. 
While the international community may wish to support them in doing so, smallness is 
ultimately a problem that small states themselves must overcome.’  
Jordan’s nuclear energy policy, therefore, is part of a broader group of policies that 
aim to achieve energy security through increasing domestic supplies of energy. The Jordanian 
policy elite use the discourse of smallness to advocate an independent and pro-active 
response to the country’s perceived/real vulnerabilities to external processes that undermine 
its energy security. This practice is not necessarily specific to Jordan and its nuclear energy 
policy. Instead, as Smith and Lee (2010, 1098) note, small states discourse no longer sees 
small states as ‘weak and vulnerable but [as] “won’t do” countries’. In this case, Jordan will 
not adhere to US policy restrictions on its nuclear energy programme – the difference here 
being that the shift to ‘won’t do’ attitudes are usually taken as part of a collective of small 
states ‘acting small’ together in a unified front against larger and more powerful actors. The 
case study of Jordan’s nuclear energy policy, however, suggests that in at least some cases 
small states can be ‘won’t do’ countries on their own without acting collectively with other 
small states.  
This finding is supportive of earlier conclusions drawn by analysing small states’ 
foreign policies. Christmas-Moller was one of the earliest scholars to conclude that small 
states use the discourse of being a small state ‘as a legitimating argument for the policy being 
pursued’ (Amstrup 1976, 166). In particular the discourse of Jordan as a transparent, 
stabilising and pro-Western member of the international community combined with the 
narrative of its economic (especially energy) vulnerability has been important in mobilising 
international state and non-state support for Jordan’s nuclear energy policy.  
Jordanian nuclear energy policy also demonstrates an interesting analytical insight 
with regards to how different levels of analysis impact small state behaviour. Some scholars 
(see: Jervis 1978, 167-217; Snyder 1991; and Schwelller 1992, 235-269) suggest that small 
states are more exposed to the problems of international anarchy, security dilemmas and 
vulnerability, and so conclude that international level processes hold the key to understanding 
small states’ behaviour. Yet the domestic factors such as resource scarcity, public pressure 
from the citizenry, national market demand for energy, and discursive practice in Jordan that 
are driving its nuclear energy policy are not synonymous with the international level 
processes that these scholars insist are exclusively relevant. The counter-argument (that 
domestic level processes are most relevant in informing small state behaviour) has also been 
made. Elman (1995, 171-217) has challenged analyses that merely focus on international 
level processes, however, this was done by considering domestic level political processes. 
What Jordanian nuclear energy policy suggests is that political and economic processes are 
both relevant in determining small state behaviour. Thus a political economy approach that 
incorporates both international and domestic processes is perhaps more valid. 
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Conclusions  
 
This paper has sought to make a modest contribution to two distinct but increasingly related 
areas of investigation. It has sought to further our understanding of small states and their 
behaviour in the Middle East by asking two questions: first, what constitutes a small state in 
the Middle East? Second, do small states simply bandwagon and comply with their great 
power allies or can they also pursue their own goals even given objections from great powers? 
This study has also attempted to contribute to discussions on nuclear proliferation (primarily 
in relation to nuclear energy proliferation but also broader nuclear proliferation in terms of 
dual use/sensitive technologies) in the Middle East and beyond by asking: to what extent is 
nuclear energy proliferation a viable policy for small states?   
In answering the first question, this paper has found that empirical definitions of 
smallness that rely on measuring material realties are not helpful in defining Jordan as a small 
state. Furthermore, more recent interpretivist approaches in their current form that rely on 
understanding discursive practices may also not be suitable to this case. We need to interpret 
discursive practices that not only create and reinforce realties of insecurity and vulnerability 
but also result in a ‘can do’ attitude. Jordan is a small state because its decision-making 
elite’s discourse is dominated by concepts of vulnerability, underdevelopment, insecurity, 
and limited capabilities to influence external processes. But this discourse also represents 
Jordan as a transparent, stabilising actor with legitimate sovereign rights and the capabilities 
for domestic action.  
With regards to the second question, this article finds that we cannot simply expect 
small states to bandwagon with the policies of their great power allies, nor can we expect 
them to adopt a ‘can’t do’ or ‘won’t do’ attitude. Another possible behavioural outcome is for 
small states to respond to perceived challenges and threats with a ‘can do’ attitude – they act 
because they are small, not in spite of it. This study demonstrates that in the case of nuclear 
energy proliferation in Jordan, bandwagoning with US policies does not take place. Yet this 
study does not claim that Jordan never bandwagons with the United States in other areas. 
Assessing the likelihood of bandwagoning in other policy areas is not within the remit of this 
study – and indeed, Jordanian bandwagoning with US policies in other issue areas is common. 
This study has only sought to demonstrate that we cannot simply assume that small states 
always bandwagon with their great power allies. 
In addressing the third question about the extent to which nuclear proliferation for 
energy generation is a viable policy for small states, we can conclude that in the case of 
Jordan (and therefore, likely other small states in the Middle East) rather than being limited 
by the dominant domestic and external discourse of ‘smallness’, the Jordanian government 
continues to pursue a nuclear energy programme because it perceives Jordan as being a small 
state. It is the understanding of vulnerability, limited capabilities and other features of its 
smallness that has promoted nuclear energy as a solution to respond to Jordan’s small state 
insecurities. Perhaps Browning (2006, 674) offers a salient summarising point when he states 
that ‘[a] small state identity need not always be equated with weakness and limited capacities 
of action.’ Nuclear energy proliferation in Jordan and other small states is likely to continue.  
 Of course this article is limited to one policy area in only one state in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, this case study and the core research questions being addressed are to an extent 
still open-ended as the implementation of the Jordanian policies studied here is yet to fully 
materialise. This offers us the opportunity to develop and test theoretical ideas about small 
states’ behaviour but in order to further understand the ways in which discursive practices 
influence realities of smallness and what this means for the behaviour of small states it will 
be useful to consider other policy areas both within Jordan and other states. These areas for 
future study could include looking at nuclear energy policies in other small states in the 
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Middle East as well as specific defence/military, development and economic policies. This 
would allow us to expand our sample and compare findings for similarities and contradictions 
to strengthen or disprove the findings made here.  
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